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After implementation ofthe National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1961-1966), Thailand experienced increasing high rates of economic growth. However 
by mid 1997, Thailand's economy was slipping into the so-called "Thailand financial 
crisis": falling property prices, slowing exports, rising trade deficits, and the devaluation 
of the Thai baht. This raises concern about the future. The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine Thai economic policies leading up to current crisis. Using hypothesis of 
Williamson and Haggard, the country's economic reforms will be evaluated. From these 
finding, several conclusions will be drawn concerning the country's economic future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1950, after a century of zero growth of output per head of population, Thailand 
was one of the poorest countries in the world 1.' After the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan was instituted in 1961, the Thai economy was transformed. 
According to those plans, rapid and sustained growth of output was achieved 
simultaneously with low inflation and only moderate growth of external debt. The 
incidence of poverty fell dramatically. Despite the internal turmoil caused by the two oil 
price shocks of the 1970s, Thailand did not experienced a single year of negative growth, 
even in per capita terms, an achievement unmatched by any other oil importing, 
developing country2. 
In the late 1980s, Thailand's economy was increasingly oriented to the 
commercial and industrial sectors. From 1986 to 1991, Thai's GDP and per capita 
income doubled? The Thai economy was still among the fastest growing economies in 
the world. Manufactured exports surged, and investment from both domestic and foreign 
sources increased dramatically. However, the Thai financial crisis marked a stunning 
reversal for the Thai economy, which grew at rates of more than eight percent a year for 
much of the last decade, before slipping into trouble in 1996 amid falling property prices, 
slowing exports, and rising trade deficits. Thais enjoyed this economic growth and never 
thought that their country would face financial problems. 
1 Peter G. Warr, "The Thai Economic In Transition", 1993, p.l. 
2 Ibid., p.l. 
3 Robinson, David, Byeon, Yangho, and Teja, Ranjit, with Tseng, Wanda, Thailand: Adjusting to Success 
Current Policy Issues, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., August 1991, p. 10. 
1 
At the end of 1996, there was still no evidence that would make the Thais believe 
that Thailand was having any serious financial problems. Up until then, the Thai 
economy had been strong. On July 2, the financial crisis began with interest and 
exchange rates swinging wildly from day to day in the fallout from the managed float of 
the baht.4 
This research focuses on the current state of the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan that has been used in Thailand, the current political climate, and the 
Thai government's current action during this crisis. This thesis will evaluate and predict 
the future of Thailand's economy using the four general categories of Williamson and 
Harggard's hypothesis5: 1) economic conditions, 2) political conditions, 3) the position of 
the implementing team, and 4) the nature of the program itself. 
A. RESEARCH SCOPE 
This thesis will address the current financial crisis in Thailand up until the end of 
February 1998 and will examine the four categories mentioned above. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis will consist of archival research, as well as a 
literature search of books, magazine articles, Internet articles, newspaper articles, and 
other library information sources. Then, all information will be evaluated in terms of the 
four categories. 
4 US $1 = 40 Baht (mid-May 1998) 
5 Williamson and Haggard (1994) list thirteen conditions ("hypothesis") which may explain the success or 
failure of various economic reforms. The thirteen conditions are grouped under four general categories: 
economic conditions, political conditions, the position of the implementing team, and the nature of the 
2 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
It is very important for developing countries to persuade investors to invest in 
their country. Although a country may have a sound banking system, skilled labor, and a 
strong economy that investors can trust, investors will not invest their money if that 
country's political system is not stable. Thus, Chapter II details the history of the Thai 
political system up until the present day. The end of this chapter indicates whether it is 
stable enough to attract investors. 
Chapter III gives an overview of economic development following the inception 
of the National Economic and Social Development Plan. This chapter also examines 
whether this plan helped develop Thailand's economy in the past and analyzes the current 
plan. 
Chapter IV identifies the financial crisis in Thailand and also indicates when this 
crisis occurred, what its impact is, and what actions the Thai government has taken. 
Chapter V presents the conclusions, including a summary of how the information 




n. THE GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION OF THAILAND 
Located in Southeast Asia, Thailand has a total area of 514,000 sq. Ian, including 
511,770 sq. Ian ofland and 2,230 sq. Ian of water, which makes it slightly more than 
twice the size of Wyoming. Thailand has common borders measuring 1,754 Ian with 
Laos on the north and east, 803 Ian with Cambodia on the east, 506 Ian with Malaysia on 
the south, and 1,800 km with Burma on the north and west6. Even though it is 
surrounded by these countries, Thailand still has the southern border, which connects to 
water--the Gulf of Thailand to the east and the Andaman Sea to the west. Because 
Thailand is located between the 5th and 21 st north parallels and the 97th and 106th east 
meridian 7, it has a good climate for agriculture and also has many natural resources, such 
as tin, rubber, natural gas, tungsten, tantalum, timber, lead, fish, gypsum, lignite, fluorite, 
etc. Thailand is the only territory of Southeast Asia that did not come under Western 
imperial controls. 
The country has a population of59,450,818 (July 1997 est.), including Thai (75 
percent), Chinese (14 percent), and other (11 percent). Thai is the main language, while 
English is the secondary language of the elite. Buddhism is the primary religion in 
Thailand: Buddhism (95 percent), Muslim (3.8 percent), Christianity (0.5 percent), 
Hinduism (0.1 percent), other (0.6 percent) (1991t 
6 CIA World Factbook, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatllongterm!worldreflcountry/thailand.htm. 
7 David A. Wilson, Government and Politics of Southeast Asi!!, Cornell University Press, 1959, p. 4. 
8 William J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy, East-West Center Press, 1966, p. 3. 
9 CIA World Factbook, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatllongterm!worldreflcountrv/thailand.htm. 
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A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THAI SOCIETY 
Thailand is an agrarian societylO. Eighty-eighty percent of the population either 
are farmers or conduct agricultural-related activities. Because of its agriculture-oriented 
background, the Thai society still holds on to old customs as guidelines for living. Some 
examples are: relying on kindred relationships or association with close friends as 
indicators of trust and intimacy; believing in superstition because of a dependence on 
nature, which is beyond their control; placing greater emphasis on status than on 
capacity; and being sentimentally attached to their place of residence. These values blend 
with Buddhism, the main religion of most Thais, resulting in characteristics common to 
most Thais: gentleness, kindness, generosity, and a dislike of being forced or forcing 
othersll. 
The lifestyles in rural and urban areas differ. The rural life in Thailand, based on 
brotherhood and equality, is not a complicated life. Old, traditional values, such as 
believing in things that cannot be proved and respect for elders, are still strong. Thus, 
rural society tends to ignore what is going on in urban areas, especially if the political and 
economic situations there do not directly affect what happens in the rural areas. Unlike 
the harmony of rural society, society in urban areas, where people live in an air toxic 
environment, a lack of brotherhood, harsh competition, anger, and mental and physical 
suffering, is much more complicated to live in. However, people in the urban areas have 
a better education and a better opportunity to find a higher-paying job than those in rural 
areas. Thus, they are very concerned about information, technology, and the economic 
10 Anned Forces Infonnation Office, Democracy in Thailang, p. 15. 
11 Ibid., p. 15. 
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and political situation because all of these affect the Thai economy on which they depend 
so heavily. 
B. AN OVERVIEW OF THAI POLITICAL HISTORY 
Thailand was ruled by an absolute monarchy for more than 700 years. During the 
era of King Rama V, VI, and VII of the Chakri Dynasty (1868-1935), the king tried to 
initiate democracy in Thailand by giving freedom to all Thai slaves and by creating a toy-
model town named "Dusit Thani" 12as an experimental model of democracy that would 
lead to the future democratization of the country. However, it was very difficult to 
establish democracy because the Thai people did not know what democracy was. Indeed, 
they had no idea about it at all. 
On June 24, 1932, the absolute monarchy in Thailand was ended due to a 
bloodless coup by a group of western-educated military and civilian bureaucrats, the so-
called People's Party. In the same year, the People's Party promulgated the first 
constitution, proclaiming a "constitutional democracy.,,13 The King would still be the 
head of the state, but his power was constrained by the constitution. The first Prime 
Minister of Thailand was Phaya Manopakorn, a civilian bureaucrat and a leading member 
of the People's Party. 
Until now, there have been 26 military governments and eight military-dominated 
governments, as well as 17 coups. In 1938, the military's role in Thai politics began to 
grow after Field Marshal Pibul Pibulsongram, one of the leading members of the People's 
12 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Party, became Prime Minister. His cabinet consisted mainly of army officers. During 
WW II, Pibul's military government allied with the Japanese while Pridi, a civilian 
bureaucrat and also a leading member of the People's Party, formed an underground 
movement against the Japanese. Pibul's military government collapsed in 1944. 
Between August 1945 and November 1947, there were eight cabinets and five Prime 
Ministers, all civilian. During this era, all governments under civilian control were 
unstable because they had many economic problems, suffered from corruption, and 
experienced conflicts among civilian politicians. In April 1948, Pibul came back to 
power. On September 16, 1957, his military government was ended once again by a 
military coup led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the army commander-in-chief 
During his years in power, Sarit believed that the democratic system was not 
suitable for the Thai people and Thai society. In order to rebuild and refresh the country, 
he thought the Thai people must be ruled by absolute power and authoritarianism. 
Nevertheless, during the six years of his military government, he did his job well by 
encouraging development of the national economy and infrastructure, and by improving 
the living standard of the Thai people. 
After Sarit's death in 1963, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn became Prime 
Minister. He followed Sarit's policies for ruling the country. In October 1973, hundreds 
of thousands of students and other people gathered to put pressure on Thanom's military 
government for political reforms, a new constitution, and an elected parliament. After the 
fighting between these citizens and the military, Thanom's military government came to 
an end. Thanom was exiled from the country that year. 
13 Clark D. Neher and Ross Marlay, Democracy and Development in Southeast Asii!, Colorado: View West 
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In October 1973, the Thai people instituted their democracy by electing civilians 
to form a new government through elections without military intervention. After three 
years, in October 1976, military officers overthrew the civilian government again. 
Thanin Kraivichien, a civilian, was appointed by the coup to be the new Prime Minister. 
One year later, he was accused of indirectly supporting the Communist Party of Thailand 
and leading the country to disaster. The same coup that brought Thanin to power staged 
another coup to throw him out. General Kriangsak, a leading member of that coup, 
became the new Prime Minister. 
In early 1980, General Kriangsak resigned because ofa lack of military support 
and conflict within the government. General Prem Tinsulanonda, a Defense minister and 
commander-in-chief, was appointed to be the new Prime Minister. Even though General 
Prem was not an elected Member of Parliament, Thailand was democratized more than it 
was in the past. For instance, there were two general elections for the Lower House in 
which all Thai people had absolute freedom to choose their representatives. In another 
reform, cabinet members were elected members of the Lower House. 
General Prem held office from 1980 through 1988 due to his reputation of 
honesty, and due to support from military, political party leaders, and, above all, "the 
King." He also achieved cooperation among the military, political parties, and the 
civilian bureaucracy that helped the rate of economic growth to rise. However, there 
were two unsuccessful coups in the Prem era. After his second four-year term, in 1988, 
Prem refused to be prime minister during the next term. 
Press Inc., 1995, p. 29. 
9 
A general election was held in July 1988. General Chatichai Choonhavan, a 
leader of Chat Thai Party, became prime minister since his political party had won a 
plurality of votes. He was the first prime minister since 1976 who was elected by 
members of the House of representatives. At that time, although Thailand enjoyed rapid 
economic growth, the military did not rely on Chatichai's government because of his 
reputation for corruption. In 1991, Chatichai's government was overthrown by a military 
coup. 
Anand, a distinguished civilian diplomat and businessman, was appointed by that 
coup to be the new prime minister. A new election was held on March 22, 1992. 
General Suchinda, a leading member of the coup, became prime minister due to support 
from military and pro-military political parties. The people were not satisfied with his 
premiership because he had declared that he would not accept any position in the new 
government. The conflict between the people and the military government again 
occurred in May, 1992, the so-called "Black May Incident." Finally, Suchinda resigned 
after one-and-a-half months in office. This demonstration affected the military's role in 
politics. The military became more professional, and there have been no more military 
coup attempts. Anan was again appointed to be a prime minister in order to take care of 
the government. 
A new election was held on September 13, 1992. Chuan Leekpai, a civilian and 
leader of the Democrat Party (DP or Prachathipat Party), became prime minister since his 
political party won a plurality of the votes; a coalition government was formed. In his 
coalition government, there were many problems among political parties. Some allied 
parties withdrew from the coalition government and joined opposition parties. In 
10 
addition, the government faced two no-confidence votes from opposition parties within 
four months. As a result, the Prime Minister dissolved the House of Representatives and. 
called for a new election on July 2, 1995. 
In 1995, Banharn Silpa Archa, a civilian and leader of the Chat Thai Party, 
became prime minister and formed a coalition government with six other parties. 
Because cabinet members lacked knowledge and experience in administration, Banharn's 
government faced a no-confidence vote by opposition parties in July 1996. Banharn was 
forced to resign from office and dissolve the House of Representatives. 
A new election was held in November 17,1996. General Chavalit Youngjaiyut, a 
former army officer and leader of the New Aspiration Party (NAP or Khwamwang Mai), 
won the election and became the twenty-second prime minister of Thailand. 
Only one year after Gen. Chavalit Y oungjaiyut became prime minister, the 
economy in Thailand declined and was in the worst condition it had ever been in before. 
Chavalit resigned from office on November 7, 1997. 
On November 14, 1997, a former prime minister, Mr. Chuan Leekpai, was 
welcomed back to power again as the twenty-third prime minister. Because of his 
reputation for honesty, it was believed he could lead Thailand out of its current economic 
crisis. 
Although Thailand was fortunate to be in a good location and have many natural 
resources, Thai politics looked very unstable to foreign countries. Surprisingly, though, 
the Thai government, in just three decades, has led the country out of poverty and off of 
the "poor country" list. Chapter ill will examine the ways in which the Thai government 
11 
has developed its country into one of the "tigers" of Southeast Asia, starting with The 
National Economic and Social Development Plan of 1961. 
12 
m. THE THAI ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN THE PAST THREE DECADES 
Thailand has succeeded in developing an average economic growth of7.8 percent 
per year. Per capita income increased from 2,100 Baht in1961 to 68,000 Baht in 1993, a 
32-times increase. Poverty was 13.7 percent in 1994, compared with the goal of20 
percent laid out in the seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan. 14 
Thailand is accepted by many countries as a nation with a high rate of economic growth, 
and, as such, it attracts foreign investment. However, the government has continually 
invested in developing fundamental services, which have increased the standard of living 
Although this development has led to economic growth and an increase in the 
standard of living, its main advantage was to urban areas. The annual per capita income 
for Thais in Bangkok16 and in major provinces such as Chon-Buri17 and Puket18 is very 
high, 16 times19 more than that in different parts of the country. This difference is 
especially true in the northeast, where annual per capita income is the lowest, 12 times 
below the national average. The most obvious difference in standard ofliving is between 
the highest 20 percent of income-earners, who increased their income by five percent 
between 1988 and 1992, and the lowest 20 percent, whose income declined by .7 percent 
14 Office of the Prime Minister, The Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan, March 1996, 
p.7. 
15 Thais refers to Thai people. 
16 Bangkok is the capital of Thailand. 
17 Chon-Burl is a province located eastern past of Thailand. 
18 Puket is a province located in the southern part of Thailand 
19 Maticohen, 25 February 1997. p. 7. 
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in the same period. The gap between the rich and the poor has negative, long-run effects 
on development. 
Because of increasing competition among the Thais, they have to do everything 
they can to stabilize or increase their income. This had led some people to engage in 
negative behavior, such as robbery. It also caused a lack of morals and discipline, for 
example ignoring the national law. The old way of life has faded with the collapse of 
society's institutions based on family and tradition. Development also has led to 
increased population density and pollution in many urban areas. One effect of living in a 
bad environment has been an increase among Thais of illnesses such as headache, cancer, 
heart attack, and high blood pressure. The rate of the illness for Thais seems to increase 
with progress in economic development and with people's income levels. 
As economic development began to accelerate, natural resources were used 
without proper management. Those natural resources and the environment were 
destroyed without plans for replacing or repairing them. Thus, the soil was stripped of its 
nutrients and water was polluted. Furthermore, the noise, air pollution, and dust in the 
urban areas also negatively affected the quality oflife. 
Along with the negative consequences of development, however, came the 
positive effects. Most Thais now take advantage of fundamental services they lacked 
before. For instance, in 1994, 97.7 percent of houses in the rural area had electricity. 
More than 75 percent in urban areas and 32 percent in rural areas had irrigation systems. 
A better transportation network is in place; roads connecting provinces, districts, and sub-
districts have increased to 210,025 kilometer in total range. The percentage of children in 
rural areas who receive mandatory education has increased to 97.7 percent. 
14 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
PLANS 
More than 40 years ago, various development plans for Thailand's economy were 
established. However, during the First to the Seventh National Economic and Social 
Development plans, the purpose of the plans mostly came from suggestion of foreign 
counties, especially the World Bank. After the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan has been in placed for 40 years, a measurement of the country's 
development was reported to the World Bank in 1994. In that year, the World Bank 
announced that, based on its annual per capita income of over $1,500, Thailand was no 
longer a poor country. 20 Before Thailand could reach this point, it had to go through 
three significant eras of economic development: 
1. Thailand's economy before 1855 
2. Thailand's economic development from 1855 to 1960 
3. The use of Thailand's economic development plan from 1961 to the present 
1. Thailand's Economy Before 1855 
Before 1855, Thailand was ruled by a monarchy. Thailand's society was still a 
small, so-called "family institute. ,,21 The country was rich with natural resources, and 
economic activity was carried out by individuals, not by the system of production or large 
industry that Thailand has today. Goods were more often exchanged via trading than by 
using money. Trade with foreign countries was not controlled by law and, thus, 
communication or trade with foreign countries depended on the individual. 
2. Thailand's Economic Development from 1855 to 1960 
20 Somnuk Nontijan, The Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan(1997-2001): The 
Analysis and Question. Rongtanaket Offset, 1996, p. 16. 
21 Ibid., p. 17. 
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Thailand first started trading formally with foreign countries in 1855. Most 
foreign trade during this time was from the public sector, not the private sector. Thailand 
still did not have rules by which individuals or the private sector had to deal with 
foreigners. As for the public sector, most of its trade activities were just responses to the 
needs of foreign countries. However, it could be said that this was Thailand's first step 
toward opening its market to the world. 
In 1950, Thailand's Economic Parliament was established to develop an economic 
development plan. Most of the support for Thailand to develop itself came from The 
World Bank. In 1958, a study of the country's development was completed and sent to 
the World Bank. The National Economic Development Plan was first used in 1961. 
Although economic development plans had already been used in many countries--e.g., 
they had been used in India for ten years, in the Philippines for nine years, in Pakistan for 
seven years, and in Malaysia for five years--it was not too late for Thailand to have its 
own economic development plan. 
3. The Use of Thailand's Economic Development Plan from 1961 to the 
Present 
For almost 40 years, The royal Thai government has implemented Eight National 
Economic and Social Development Plans. The office of the National Economic and 
Social Development Board (NESDBi2, serving under the Office of the Prime Minister, 
prepares, recommends, and revises the plans. From the first of the series to the latest, the 
plans have increasingly reflected the importance of industrial development in Thailand's 
overall economic development. Successive governments have consistently held two 
22 Robert J. Muscat, The Fifth Tiger - A Study of Thai Development Policy, p. 134. 
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policies since the first plan. First, the private sector should be the leading force in 
bringing about development; the government should take the supporting role in assisting 
and providing the private sector with infrastructure, technological resources, and human 
development. Second, the government should protect the private sector against 
competition from new state enterprises. 
a. The First Plan: "The Nation Economic Development Plan" 
(1961-1966) 
The first plan, called "the Nation Economic Development Plan," covered a 
six-year period from 1961 to 1966. Its primary objective was to raise the country's 
standard of living. This plan focused only on economic development by emphasizing 
investments in infrastructure, particularly those involving hydroelectric power, 
transportation networks and irrigation systems23 . It also established the Board of 
Investment (BOI) and encouraged the production of domestic goods to reduce imports. 
The results of using this plan were an 8.1 percent growth of GDP, a 6.3-
percent increase in income from the agricultural sector, an increase in per capita income 
of almost 50 percent, from 2,137 Baht in 1961 to 3,063 Baht in 1966, and only a 1.3-
percent rise in inflation. 24 
The main problem with the plan was that it focused entirely on economics 
and neglected social and environmental issues. Even though per capita income increased, 
this benefited only those in the urban areas. 
23 National Economic and Social Development Board, From the first to the Sixth Development Plan: Key 
Issues and Results Bangkok, 1994, p. 1. 
24 Somnuk Nontijan, The Eighth National Economic and Social Development PlanO 997-200 1): The 
Analysis and Question, Rongtanaket Offset, 1996, p. 19. 
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h. The Second National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1967-1971) 
Recognizing that an increase in productivity required infrastructure as a 
major input, the second plan (1967-1971) was created to continue the first plan. This 
plan was the first five-year plan that continued the high priority on infrastructure 
projects?5 To formally recognize the importance of social development, the word 
"social" was added to this plan. It became the National Economic and Social 
Development Plan, and is still called that today. 
This plan was very much like the first plan, but it did more to encourage 
the private sector to invest money in the industrial and service sectors. It also established 
the rural development plan and built more hospitals in rural areas to increase the standard 
of health care. 
The results of the second plan can be measured by looking at the GDP, 
which increased 7.8 percent; in addition, per capita income went up to 4,104 Baht in 
1971, a 100-percent increase from the beginning of the first plan; electrical energy 
increased to 1,169 thousand kW; and roads expanded from 8,498 km. to 11,761 km.26 
Some issues that affected this plan were that the world market was 
becoming more industrialized and that the government had to put money into maintaining 
military capability due to decreasing support from the U.S. military because of the end of 
Vietnam War. 
25 National Economic and Social De4velopment Board, From the first to the Six-th Development Plan: Key 
Issues and Results, Bangkok, 1994, p.2. 
26 Somnuk Nontijan, The Eighth National Economic and Social Development PlanCl997-2001): The 
Analysis and Questio!!, Rongtanaket Offset, 1996, p. 19. 
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As with the previous plan, this plan had some inherent problems. First, 
the difference in per capita income between urban and rural areas was obviously 
increasing, creating a bigger separation in society between rich and poor people. Another 
problem was political instability caused by the withdrawal of U.S. military troops. 
c. The Third National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1972-1976) 
A main feature of the third plan, used from 1972 to 1976, was its emphasis 
on accommodating socially and politically-oriented objectives due to the growing 
inequity in income distribution. This inequity was perceived as a threat to internal 
stability from spreading insurgency. 
This plan attempted to increase imports by adjusting the customs tax and 
by providing low-interest loans to import industries. To maintain economic stability, this 
plan focused on controlling inflation. It also aimed at reducing the difference in the 
standard of living between the urban and rural areas. And, most important, this plan 
proposed to give the same services to rural areas that the second National Economic plan 
did. 
This plan led to GDP growth of6.5 percent, as well as an increase in 
inflation to 10.8 percent. Imports of goods for industry were reduced. During this plan, 
Thailand exported cloths more than rice. The population growth rate was reduced by 
2.6%. Regional development programs to increase education and health care were 
greatly expanded, particularly in the northeast.27 
27 Ibid., p. 19. 
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The major impact on this plan came from internal and external political 
instability and from the oil crisis, which caused Thailand's economic downturn during 
the first three years of the third plan. 
The negative consequences of this plan were almost the same as the 
second plan: a failure to address quality of life and the environment. In addition, the 
income gap between people living in urban and rural areas increased further. 
d The Fourth National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1977-1981) 
The economic downturn from the third plan led policy makers to 
emphasize economic recovery in the fourth plan (1977-1981). The focus of this plan was 
to preserve and develop Thailand's natural resources. This plan was also designed both to 
develop the economy and to build social equality. Increasing the export of agricultural 
products, keeping prices of goods stable to prevent inflation, and expanding and 
distributing services to urban and rural areas were additional goals of the plan. 
This plan had some positive and negative consequences. For this five 
years period, GDP grew 7.4 percent, and inflation increased to 1l.6 percent.28 Thailand 
eliminated its trade deficit. However, the gap between income distribution increased. 
For instance, the per capita income of the farmer at the end of this plan was 11,464 Baht, 
but it was five times below the income of people who worked in the industrial sector. 
Internal political instability caused trouble during this plan. And, after this 
plan was completed, Thailand had still lost many more resources and still experienced a 
gap in income distribution. 
28 Ibid., p. 19. 
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e. The Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan 
(1982-1986) 
This plan was the first plan that focused on the tourist sector, and by the 
end of this plan, Thailand had succeeded in generating high revenues from tourists. 
There were two facets to this plan: the Offensive Plan and the Defensive Plan. 
The Offensive Plan involved: 
1. Developing the East Coast areas and the main province. 
2. Reducing the role the government plays in economic development. 
3. Giving the private sector the opportunity to help solve the economic 
problems. 
The defensive plan involved: 
1. Focusing on and keeping economic growth stable. 
2. Focusing on discipline in the treasury. 
3. Expanding the infrastructure of production. 
4. Focusing on specific areas to develop. 
5. Expanding and distributing services to rural areas. 
6. Focusing on security ofIife and property. 
The most important aspect of the fifth plan was its emphasis on 
decentralization. To decentralize, the plan focused on expanding growth and industrial 
investment in provincial areas. The fifth plan also focused on the issue of income 
distribution and social instability. The plan established "target areas" for special 
assistance in 264 districts and subdistricts. Social services were to be greatly expanded in 
these areas. However, the real focus of the plan was on the Eastern Seaboard Project, a 
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large government-supported industrial complex designed to become an alternative to 
Bangkok as an urban-industriallocation. 29 
The positive outcomes of this plan were GDP growth of 5.4 percent and a 
per capita income increase to 20,860 Baht.3D However, the western culture that began to 
saturate Thai society caused a change in the Thais's way of life. The plan was thwarted 
by increasing world economic competition that blocked external trade. 
f. The Sixth National economic and Social development Plan (1987-
1991) 
Social inequality was becoming an increasing challenge in the 
development process. Thus, the aim of this plan was to maintain high economic growth 
and help low-income populations in both urban and rural areas to gain a larger share of 
the benefits from development. An "Urban and Specific Zone Development Program" 
was established to assist people in the urban slums. In rural areas, the target zones were 
not limited to only areas threatened by insurgency because this threat had subsided. 
Therefore, the "Rural Development Program" was opened to nationwide eligibility. As 
for decentralization, the revision recommended expanding industrial investment to 
regional and rural areas. But, unlike the fifth plan, the government did not map out any 
industrial complex projects. Instead, it called for the private sector to playa bigger role 
in the process.31 
29 Robert J. Muscat, The Fifth Tiger - A Studv of Thai Development Policy, pp. 180-183. 
30 Somnuk Nontijan, The Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan(l997-2001): The 
Analysis and Questio!!, Rongtanaket Offset, 1996, p. 22. 
31 National Economic and Social Development Board, From the first to the Sixth Development Plan: Key 
Issues and Results, Bangkok, 1994, pp. 8-14. 
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At the end of this plan, economic growth was still increasing, and the GDP 
had grown 10.9 percent. Thailand was well advanced in its transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial and services-based economy, and was on the verge of joining 
the ranks of Asia's newly industrializing economies (NIES).32 Per capita income 
increased to 41,000 baht, and income from exporting increased to 25.7 percent ofGDP.33 
This plan was aided by the increasing number of foreign tourists, increased exports of 
products from the agricultural and industrial sectors, and, especially, investments from 
foreign countries due to Thailand's 1991 ranking as first in the world to invest in. 
However, political instability once again took its toll on the plan. Conflict 
between the government and the population, as evidenced by the Black May incident, 
caused potential investors to hesitate and some investors to withdraw their investments. 
Another problem for investors was the increasing price of real estate. 
g. The Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-
1996) 
After experiencing the 1987-1990 breakneck growth, policy makers have 
added another dimension to the seventh plan. This Plan focused on equality in 
development distribution. The three main goals of this plan were: 
1. Keeping the rate of economic growth stable. 
2. Focusing on income and development distribution. 
3. Increasing the development of human resources, the standard of 
living, and the environment. 
32 Robinson, David, Byeon, Yangho, and Teja, Ranjit, with Tseng, Wanda, Thailand: Adjusting to Success 
Current Policy Issues, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. August, 1991, p. 4. 
33 Somnuk Nontijan, The Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan(l 997-200 l): The 
Analysis and Ouestion, Rongtanaket Offset, 1996, p. 22. 
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A series of measures to reduce poverty and income inequality were 
proposed in the plan. These measures included improving production productivity, 
marketing and price support programs, and decentralizing industrial activities to 
provincial areas. In addition, human resources would be strengthened through 
education34. Compulsory schooling was to be increased from six to nine years. The 
government also encouraged the private sector to playa bigger role in providing higher 
education. 
This plan created many advantages for Thailand, including: 
l. 8.2 percent growth in the GDP after five years and an increase of per 
capita income to 71,000 baht. 
2. The World Bank declared Thailand off the list of the poor 
countries due to per capita income increasing to more than $1,500 or 
38,000 baht. 
3. The huge investments of318,000 million baht in the private sector and 
700,000 million baht in the public sector. 
4. The import value increased to one thousand million baht. 
Even with these successes, however, there was still a problem with the 
inequity in income distribution. The highest 20 percent income group increased their 
income 16 times more than lowest 20 percent income group. 
B. THE EIGHTH NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
PLAN (1997-2001) 
After the end of the Seventh Plan, Thailand had a new perception of its future 
development. Thailand's goals for the future include the following. 
l. Every Thai must have equal opportunity to develop himself or herself, 
including moral, physical, knowledge, and skill development. The main purpose is to 
34 David Robinson, et at., Thailand: Adjusting to Success Current Policy Issues, p. 6. 
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increase the Thai people's health, happiness, and morality. The other purpose is to make 
Thais more knowledgeable and be able to improve their ability to survive in the modern 
world. 
2. The Thai society should be efficient, hard-working, strong, free, equal, 
merciful, happy, and respectful of humanity. 
3. Thailand's economy should have the strength and stability to create equality 
in income distribution. 
4. Natural resources and the environment should be well-managed now and 
forever. 
5. The system for managing development should be decentralized and should 
create an environment of support for all Thais in the system. 
The Eighth plan incorporated the goals mentioned above; and to take the next step 
toward the development of the country, the plan adopted the following purposes: 
The first purpose is to increase and develop the capabilities of the Thai people. 
These capabilities include health, physicality, knowledge, and talent in their careers in 
order to survive changes in economics, social issues, and government. 
The second purpose is to develop the social environment and to increase society's 
stability. This purpose focuses on increasing family stability and on supporting the 
improvement of the standard of living. Furthermore, it creates opportunities for Thais to 
take part in their country's development. 
The third purpose is to develop and to expand Thailand's economy with stability 
and balance. Along with the increased opportunity to improve their capabilities and take 
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part in the development system, the Thai people will also have to share equally in the 
country's economic consequences. 
The fourth purpose is to properly manage all resources, especially natural 
resource and the environment. To support the protection of natural resources, the social 
environment should also be well-managed. 
The fifth purpose is to make the executive management system more open and to 
allow not only private or public development, but also development at all levels of Thai 
society. 
1. The Goals to Achieve 
To achieve all the purposes described above, the current plan contains the 
following goals: 
1. The preparation of efficient support systems for children below five years old. 
2. Adequate and efficient education, especially fundamental education for 
learning-age children lasting nine years to twelve years, and continuing 
education for all teachers and professors. 
3. Making improved labor skills and increased knowledge a priority for workers 
between the ages of 25 and 45. 
4. Fully supporting and increasing the development of disabled people, and also 
equally distributing fundamental services to all of those people. 
5. Reducing accidents in the workplace, as well as all accidents, especially those 
caused by cars, the transportation of dangerous chemicals, and fires in 
high-rise buildings. 
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6. Keeping inflation at a rate that does not cause too much of a negative effect on 
the Thais purchasing power. 
7. Offering adequate and efficient fundamental services to rural areas. 
8. Reducing the gap between the rich and the poor by at least ten percent. 
9. Retaining and securing at least 25 percent of all of Thailand's forest territory. 
10. Increasing crop choices for farmers to choose to cultivate in natural 
agriculture, mixed agriculture, or forest agriculture. 
11. Increasing investments in controlling and improving the environment in order 
to improve the standard of living at every level of society. 
2. The Strategy of Economic and Social Development 
To achieve all the purposes and the goals, the strategy of the Eighth Plan should 
be as follows: 
1. Human Development 
Human development includes increasing human capability and efficiency in ways 
that can make Thais morally sound and healthy. Also, it increases the knowledge that 
will enable Thai citizens' to join in the process of their country's development. 
2. Social Development 
Social development focuses on strengthening family, community, and culture. 
Doing so will support a stable society. 
3. Development in Rural Areas to Improve the Standard of Living 
First, the plan aims to distribute equally development opportunities and social 
welfare to rural areas in order to increase the efficiency of the rural community. Second, 
it will support the education system and expand community education. Third, it will 
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increase available jobs by promoting private business and private development. Fourth, it 
will distribute economic activity and social services. Finally, it will create ways to solve 
problems and maintain the environment. 
4. Supporting Human Development and Improving Standard of Living 
This part of the plan strengthens the economic system to maintain stability in 
economic growth. Also, it focuses on adjusting the fundamental production process to 
meet changes in the world market and to improve the standard ofliving by continually 
developing scientific technology that goes along with developing rural areas and 
communities. 
5. Natural Resource and Environment Management 
Good management of natural resources can create a balance in the environment. 
Securing and maintaining natural resources is fundamental for long-term development 
because it will increase the standard ofliving in every community. However, the 
advantages of a well-managed environment, including the prevention and reduction of 
natural disasters, have to be equally distributed to society. 
To increase Thailand development, both the private and public sector need to 
share resources. This strategy requires cooperation between them. If the private sector 
and public sector has a conflict with each other, the way to manage and solve the conflict 
is to use compromise. Furthermore, private sector organizations should know and 
understand what the public sector do is, and cooperate with each other to achieve national 
goals. 
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6. The Implementation of Development Plan 
This strategy is to implement the plan by setting up different appropriate plans for 
specific areas. Then, the effectiveness of those plans will be evaluated by a proper 
measurement index specific to each area. 
c. THE USE OF THE EIGHTH PLAN 
The Eight National Economic and Social Development Plan is the plan chosen to 
be used from 1997 to 2001 and to be the fundamental plan for the next century. The 
plan's strategy is based on the new development system, which transforms the separate 
development systems into one system. Each aspect of development will have to be 
efficiently connected so that the country's overall development will move forward, and all 
Thais will benefit more than they have in the past. 
The strategy and the way to develop the country using in the Eighth Plan are 
reflect a modem plan for the future. By not providing a detailed implementation plan for 
the public sector, this plan allows every branch to create ideas of how to work within 
their organizations by themselves. The purpose of doing so came from the increasing 
responsibility of those branches to its duty. Another strategy is that this plan must 
directly provide advantages to all Thais, not specific for one group, and also that all Thais 
must have the right to make their own decisions, to express their opinions, and to ask for 
support from the government. 
A development plan comes from the cooperative efforts of every organization in 
both the private and public sectors. Every person has a clear duty and a clear 
responsibility for the plan's success. Using money and resources created by both private 
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and public sector to implement the strategic plan might be used as a tool to ask for more 
funding and supporting from the government. However, yearly measurements for those 
organizations have to be created and then be used to control and to evaluate the plan's 
effectiveness. 
To evaluate the success or failure of the strategic plan, five levels of measurement 
were created. The first level is to collect data in all areas, including periodic surveys of 
people's opinions of the development plan. The second-level evaluation is based on all 
performances of people who take responsibility for the project and all benefits of people 
who feel the effect of the outcomes. The third level measures the efficiency of the 
production process in every branch. The fourth measures the efficiency and quality of all 
institutions inside and outside the public sector. The last level measures the overall effect 
ofthe economic, social, and natural resource plans in order to continually develop the 
next strategy and plan. 
As a consequence of adopting the National Economic and Social Development 
Plan, Thailand has succeeded in economic development. Since 1986, growth in real per 
capita income averaged 5 percent each year and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
grew at about 9 percent a year since 1986, but slowed down in 1996. Poverty has been 
reduced from over 57 percent in the late 1960s to about 13 percent today. Thailand has 
enjoyed dramatic improvements in other indicators of social welfare, such as food 
security, education, infant mortality, and life expectancy. By following a development 
strategy of outward orientation and receptivity to foreign investment, Thailand has 
evolved from an agrarian-based economy to an industrialized export-intensive one, with 
diversified economic activity and employment. Although Thailand has been one of the 
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fastest growing economies in the world, it has experienced periods of instability during 
the last decade. 
During the early 1980s, fiscal imbalances and external oil shocks prompted a 
period of adjustment and structural reform involving fiscal retrenchment, improved 
exchange rate management, and export promotion. The stabilization program was a 
success. Terms of trade improved, and the economy flourished, recording a GDP growth 
rate of 12 percent a year between 1987 and 1990, and 8 percent growth between 1991 and 
1995. Thailand's exports from the manufacturing sector rose from 35 to 80 percent of 
total merchandise exports, the largest percentage of any Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) country, but experienced a slowdown in 1996.35 
Although Thailand has succeeded in economic development during the past three 
decades, it now faces economic problems, the so-called "Thailand Financial crisis." The 
crisis, which started on July 2, 1997, has caused a serious economic downturn. The next 
chapter will describe this crisis and identify its causes. 
35 Internet, http://www.bkkpost.samart.co.th. 
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IV. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THAILAND 
A. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
After three decades of impressive economic development, Thailand is in the 
middle of an economic crisis. In the summer of 1997, the Thai baht came under strong 
pressure and experienced a large depreciation as financial markets considered its pegged 
exchange rate as unsustainable in view of its large current account deficit. Short-tenn 
external debt has risen substantially over the past few years, fueling unsustainable 
domestic consumption, a real estate boom and raising concerns over the soundness of the 
financial system. 
To support the necessary balance of payments adjustment, a stand-by program 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was agreed to in August 1997, which 
provided the basis for a $17 billion emergency international financing package, of which 
the World Bank will contribute $1.5 billion in structural adjustment lending and technical 
assistance.36 
Until July 2, 1997, the interest and exchange rates were swinging wildly from day 
to day in the fallout from the managed float of the baht. Despite liberalized capital flow, 
a fixed exchange rate proved to be the undoing of the Thai economy. Foreign funds 
poured into the market to profit from interest rate spreads, fuelling asset price inflation 
that eventually undermined the financial sector. 
The Bank of Thailand, wary of an increasing current account deficit, learned from 
Mexico's crisis in 1995 the dangers of relying on short-tenn inflows. It took several steps 
36 Internet, http://www.bkkpost.samart.co.th. 
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to cool the overheating economy. International banking facilities were ordered to set 
aside 7% provision for short-term loans. The practical effect of the measure was a surge 
in loans with maturities of one year plus one day. 
Finance companies were ordered to reduce their exposure to the property sector. 
Margin requirements were raised for securities purchases. Commercial banks were 
ordered to reduce foreign exchange exposure, and regulators pondered new rules to limit 
the inherent risks of derivative products on the finance system. But deficits in the current 
and trade accounts worsened for 1996 over the year before. A series of customs and 
excise tax hikes on luxury imports did little to stem rampant consumer spending. 
In June 1996, the International Monetary Fund, folIowing its annual consultations 
with Thailand, warned that the increase in the current account deficit had increased the 
country's vulnerability to economic shocks and shifts in sentiment. 
While the tight monetary stance was praised by the IMF, more fundamental 
policy changes were needed to counter the large and volatile capital inflows entering as a 
result of capital account liberalization. One IMF paper stated: 
"The stability of the baht had served the Thai economy well in the 
past, but directors recommended a greater degree of exchange rate 
flexibility to improve monetary autonomy and to reduce the incentive for 
short-term capital inflows," 37 
But political turmoil caused continuous reshuffling among the top ranks of 
economic policy makers, hindering any consideration of policy shifts at the Bank of 
Thailand and the Finance Ministry. Meanwhile, the US dollar continued to gain ground 
37 Internet, http://www.bkkpost.samart.co.th. 
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against other currencies. From the spring of 1995 to mid-1997, the dollar strengthened by 
more than 50% against the yen and 25% against the German mark. 
The dollar's strength stemmed from large capital inflow into US markets, as foreign 
investors rushed to invest in fixed-income securities. Foreign net purchases oflong-term 
US government and corporate bonds in 1996 jumped by 70% over 1995 levels. 
As the dollar gained ground, so did the baht. Analysts had calculated that 
Thailand's 13-year basket system gave an 80% weight to the dollar, 12% to the yen and 
8% to the mark. The appreciation of the baht caused Thai exporters to lose market share 
steadily against regional trading competitors. Labor-intensive industries such as textiles, 
footwear and clothing gradually gave ground to new competitors in China and Vietnam. 
Agricultural exports were still dampened by the effects of the flood of 1995. And higher-
end industries such as computer components and automobiles were hampered by global 
overcapacity and local human resource deficiencies. 
Rising labor costs, domestic interest rates and other expenses also helped erode 
Thailand's price edge in global markets, culminating in exports shrinking by 1.3% in 
1996, versus growth of24% posted the year before. 
Currency speculators and hedge funds had begun exploring the willingness of the 
central bank to defend the basket as early as late 1996. On paper, Thailand's official 
foreign reserves of$39.2 billion last January, equivalent to 6.6 months of imports, 
appeared sufficient to deal with any speculative attacks. 
Before the beginning of the crisis, the Bank of Thailand was forced to maintain 
tight monetary policies throughout 1995 and 1996 to fund the current account deficit, 
support the baht and constrain inflation. High domestic interest rates depressed the 
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property and equity markets, affecting the loan quality of bank and finance company 
portfolios. The high spread between foreign and domestic interest rates also provided an 
incentive for local corporations to seek offshore financing. 
The public determination voiced by the authorities to maintain the basket system 
also caused many corporations to pass up hedging their currency risks. While local 
commercial banks were required to net their foreign exchange positions, they 
nevertheless experienced higher credit risk because of the largely open positions of their 
clients' borrowings. 
The high external indebtedness of the corporate sector, mostly open to currency 
volatility, is believed to be the main reason policy makers did not seek to adjust the 
basket mechanism. Various proposals expanding the trading bandwidth from four satang 
38around the official mid-rate to eight satang had been floated in 1996, but none was 
implemented. 
Regardless, the central bank was caught in a policy dilemma: propping up the 
baht with high interest rates was depressing the local economy and leading to a 
deterioration of asset quality held by the financial sector. In May 1997, adverse 
economic news and fears of an interest rate hike in the Japanese market caused a massive 
speculative attack on the baht. Reports had international hedge funds betting as much as 
$10 billion on devaluation, taking short positions in spot, forward and options markets 
against the baht. 
38 100 Satang = 1 baht 
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The Bank of Thailand responded with strong intervention in the spot market, 
committing about $4 billion in reserves in defense of the baht. Selective capital controls 
were employed to cut off offshore speculators from access to the baht. 
On May 15, 1997, the central bank coerced local banks to restrain from extending 
baht to offshore banks. The next day, local commercial banks were restricted from 
conducting foreign exchange swaps of baht for dollars with offshore flrms. Spot market 
transactions to identifled offshore speculators were also prohibited. The measures had 
the effect of splitting the market into onshore and offshore tiers. Annual interest rates for 
baht borrowings offshore roared to as much as 1,300%, squeezing speculators to close 
positions. 
Some market participants turned to dumping their equity investments to raise the 
baht necessary to complete their offshore transactions. In response, the authorities 
ordered that sale proceeds of foreign stock holdings in the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
must be delivered in dollars. No such limitations were applied for debt instruments in the 
money market, with the central bank recognizing the continued need by local 
corporations for offshore flnancing and debt rollover. While the central bank 
successfully fended off the pressures on the baht in mid-May, the actions taken did not 
alter the fundamental weaknesses in the economy. 
On July 2, treasury executives from foreign and local commercial banks were 
called into an emergency meeting with officials at the Bank of Thailand. There they 
received a bombshell: the central bank would announce later that day that the basket 
mechanism would be eliminated in favor of a managed float. The baht promptly dropped 
by 15-20% in value against the dollar. 
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Many economists had predicted earlier that the central bank would inevitably be 
forced to expand the bandwidth or devalue the baht. Few predicted the authorities would 
take an even more aggressive step and implement a float, where market forces would be 
left to determine the baht1s exchange rate. But it had become clear that the resources of 
the authorities to defend the baht had steadily eroded. Foreign reserves at the end of June 
totaled just $32.4 billion. 
Capital controls imposed in May had also showed signs of reduced effectiveness, 
with offshore participants gaining access to baht needed to settle their swap obligations 
with the central bank. Further downward pressure on the baht came from a rush by 
corporations to hedge their foreign currency loans. 
In August 1997, the central bank revealed why it was necessary to float the baht 
and eventually tum to assistance from the International Monetary Fund. Regulators had 
not only spent billions in hard currency to intervene in the market, but had also 
committed up $23.4 billion in forward obligations to August 1998 to swap dollars for 
baht. The numbers were alarming. In this month, Thailand 1s total foreign debt of $89 
billion, with some $71 billion to the private sector and $20 billion coming due by the end 
of 1997.39 
Investor confidence in the central bank1s external position continued to fall. 
Reserves at the end of August totaled just $25.9 billion, sufficient to cover only three 
months of exports. The majority of reserves cannot be accessed for intervention in the 
market, being required by law to be held to back up the local money supply. 
39 Internet, http://www.bkkpost.samart.co.th. 
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Following the float, the Bank of Thailand hiked the bank lending rate 200 basis points to 
12.5%. Interest rates stayed high throughout July and August on tight liquidity in the 
market. Nevertheless, the baht continued to fall and capital inflow trickled to a halt, as 
investor confidence failed amid widespread rumors of the precariousness of several 
finance companies and small banks. 
B. THE MAIN REASONS FOR THE CRISIS 
There are five reasons to be concerned the cause of this financial crisis as follows: 
1. Excessive external debt 
2. Huge deficits in the current account 
3. Exchange rate mismanagement 
4. The collapse of the property sector 
5. Political instability, incompetence and negligence 
1. Excessive External Debt 
In 1997, the IMF estimated that the country's external debt was about $99 billion, 
or about 55.5% ofGDP. The majority of this debt, privately incurred, is $71.7 billion. 
On the other hand, the external debt of the public sector was $27.3 billion, which made 
Thailand one of the least publicly-indebted countries. 
The huge external debt sharply lifted the country's debt service ratio (the ratio of 
principal and interest payments to exports) from 11.4% in 1994 to 15.5% in 1997. Phatra 
Research Institute reported: 
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"The average debt/equity ratio of listed non-finance sector 
companies increased from 1.58 in 1994 to 1.98 in 1996, and their ratio of 
earnings. Before tax and interest payments to liabilities decreased from 
14.2% in 1994 to 10.7% in 1996.,,40 
As a consequence, these companies are highly vulnerable. 
2. Huge Deficits in the Current Account 
Thailand's deficit was 8% ofGDP in 1995 and 7.9% in 1996. In addition, the 
export growth rate decreased from 23.6% in 1995 to zero in 1996. The deficits caused 
the country to rely heavily on external borrowing. 
3. Exchange Rate Mismanagement 
With a fixed exchange rate and the liberalization of international capital flows, 
foreign money poured in between 1993 and 1996 attracted by high interest rates. The 
baht became overvalued against other currencies, partly slowing down growth in exports 
for 1996. But the central bank persisted in pegging the baht to a basket of currencies in 
which the dollar had 80% influence. 
Speculators attacked the baht in February and May 1997. To defend the currency, 
official foreign reserves were used, falling from $39.2 billion in January to $32.4 billion 
in June. In addition, the central bank sold $23.4 billion of the reserves on the forward 
market - a sale hidden from the public until August. 
On July 2, the central bank had to replace the fixed exchange rate regime with a 
"managed float," as it could no longer tap the reserves. The baht has since fallen steadily 
from 25.8 to the dollar on July 1 to a trading range of 45-49 baht to the dollar. The 
mismanagement of the exchange rate system and the rehabilitation of the Bangkok Bank 
of Commerce have been cited as evidence of the incompetence of the central bank. 
40 Internet, http://www.bkkpost.samart.co.th. 40 
4. The Collapse of the Property Sector 
This sector began to boom in the late 1980s. With the liberalization of 
international capital flow after the introduction of the Bangkok International Banking 
Facilities in March 1993, the sector grew rapidly. By 1995, an oversupply of housing 
emerged, expanding into a major problem. With loans increasingly expensive and hard 
to get under the central bank's squeeze on lending, the sector began to collapse in 1996. 
The sector's debts totaled around 800 billion baht in 1996. Debts of the 26 share 
market-listed developers were put at 200 billion baht the year before. The slump in 
property sales market and the restrictions on lending worsened developers' cashflow 
troubles and defaults on interest payments. For example, in February 1997, Somprasong 
Land and Place defaulted on interest payments on Euro-convertible debentures worth $80 
million. 
Many finance companies and some small banks faced liquidity problems, with 16 
finance companies suspended in June 1997 and another 42 in August. In December, 56 of 
them were closed permanently. 
5. Political Instability, Incompetence and Negligence 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's administration, which lost power in November, 
performed poorly in economic management. Its economic teams lacked common goals, 
and failed to deal with mismanagement by the technocrats. Confidence of foreign and 
domestic investors slipped away, and the economy continued to worsen after the 1996 
November elections. 
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c. THE WAY TO SURVIVE 
Although Thailand was in the middle of the financial trouble, it still has some 
positive signs as follows: 
1. In 1997, parliament passed a new constitution in which an election was 
proposed for the middle of 1998. Under the constitution, the new parliament and 
government were expected to be more concerned about the national interest above all 
others. 
2. The new government's economic team has done a good job, especially in 
respecting the government's policy of restructuring the finance sector and gaining 
supporting loans from other countries. For example, the World Bank Country Director in 
Thailand, J. Shivakumar said: 
"The World Bank strongly welcomes the decision announced 
today by the Finance Ministry on the rehabilitation plans submitted by the 
58 suspended finance companies. The criteria which have led to the 
approval of only two plans are clear signs that the Government is 
committed to restoring confidence in its financial system. We applaud the 
FRA for the courage shown in this difficult task and the professionalism 
demonstrated. The World Bank anticipates that the international 
community will view this effort favorably," 41 
In Washington, on January 23, 1998, Thailand's Finance Minister, Tarrin 
Nimmanahaeminda, held extensive discussions with World Bank Acting President Sven 
Sandstrom. The Minister thanked the World Bank for its support and timely financing, 
noting that the renewal of dialogue on structural reform issues had helped Thailand 
weather the crisis. 
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Minister Tarrin re-affirmed that Thailand's macro-economic stabilization program 
would agree with the multilateral development organizations and refonns in the financial 
sector. Mr. Sandstrom congratulated the Minister on Thailand's steady progress and on 
implementing the stabilization program and the structural adjustment program. The 
World Bank, for its part, would continue to support Thailand with a program that 
included restoring confidence in the financial sector, supporting the privatization 
program, and strengthening Thailand's corporate governance framework to promote 
greater availability and disclosure. The Bank also assisted the Government in designing 
social safety nets to protect the poor and other vulnerable groups during the crisis. The 
program supported the most efficient social sector programs and assisted new 
organizations to facilitate access to the poor by working closely with non-governmental 
organizations at the local and grass-roots level. 
After meeting with the Thai Minister, World Bank President, James D. 
Wolfensohn visited the Asia region a week later. Thailand was his first stop. Mr. 
Wolfensohn was welcomed by minister Tarrin and assured of the continued financial 
partnership of Thailand. Another investment in Thailand's industry came from Gennany 
when that country agreed to provide financial assistance worth 150 million marks (3.6 
billion baht). This event was consummated when, German Finance Minister, Theo 
Waigel, arrived in Thailand with a 50-member delegation. Dr Waigel met Finance 
Minister Tarrin Nimmanhaeminda for one hour and discussed the state of the Thai 
economy. 
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"Dr. WaigeI praised Thailand for moving in the right direction to 
tackle its economic problems and the German government would also help 
in negotiating with German banks the provision of their loans to Thai 
corporations", 42Mr. Tarrin said. 
Germany also made a commitment in a memorandum to extend 100 million 
marks in guarantees through the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand and 
commercial banks for financing purchases of German goods and funding projects 
supported by German firms. Another 50 million marks would be used to support small 
and medium-sized enterprises. Germany also pledged to lend technical assistance in 
Thailand's efforts to upgrade banking supervision systems and privatization of state 
enterprises. 
Dr. Waigel said he would report his findings about the Thai economy to attendees 
at the G7 Finance Ministers/Central Bank meetings in London. Dr Waigel and Mr. 
Tarrin also presided over the signing of a loan agreement between Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau (KfW), Germany's state development bank, and the IFCT. The IFCT will 
borrow $30 million, half as a subordinated loan and half as senior debt, over lO-years to 
support projects between Thailand and Germany. The $30 million loan was the ninth 
made by KfW to the corporation. The loan would help encourage investment in Thailand 
and bolster confidence of foreign investors in the country's long-term economic 
prospects. 
Most importantly for Thailand at this moment is the securing trust from the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) to heal its financial crisis. In early August 1997, as it 
became more apparent that Thailand's balance of payments structure was becoming 
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shakier, then finance minister, Thanong Bidaya traveled to Japan to seek financial 
assistance from its government and commercial banks. 
Japanese officials declined to provide unilateral assistance, saying any package 
should be made under a broad-based economic restructuring program arranged by the 
IMF. On August 19, 1997, the government announced it would formally enter a 34-
month IMF program, receiving a standby credit line of$14.5 billion to supplement 
reserves and alleviate pressures on the balance of payments. The IMF and Japan would 
provide $4 billion each; China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Australia and Singapore $1 billion 
each; Indonesia, Korea and Brunei another $500 million each. 
Another $2.7 billion in structural adjustment loans from the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank were granted to help restructure the financial and industrial 
sectors and deal with the social disruption expected over the lifespan of the program. 
A key element of the program highlighted the need for an immediate tightening in fiscal 
and monetary policy. A 1998 fiscal surplus target of 1 % of gross domestic product, or 
about 69 billion baht, was set to finance the restructuring of the financial sector. 
Expectations were high that the acceptance of the IMF package would quickly lead to a 
restoration of investor confidence, and thus, to a rebound in the value of the baht. 
This did not occur, however, primarily because of continued concerns about the stability 
of the banking and finance sector and confusing policy signals from the political 
leadership. 
During March 1998, after the great success of Mr. Chuan Leekpai's three day 
official visit to Washington, he announced President Bill Clinton's pledges to support 
Thai exports, provide technical assistance to some state agencies and ease the financial 
45 
woes of Thai students in the US caused by the baht depreciation. The US assistance is 
worth $1.7 billion, of which $1 billion would be provided by the US Export-Import Bank 
(Ex-1m) to ease the credit crunch in Thailand's export sector. 
Also, the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation COPIC) would also 
provide $400 million in support of two Thai electric projects and would make available 
$45 million in OPIC guarantee investment funds for equity investment in Thai 
companies. The US Trade Development Agency (USTDA) would finance feasibility 
studies on the privatization oflocomotive and rolling stock maintenance facilities for the 
state railway of Thailand. It would provide technical assistance to upgrade a 
communications network for the Provincial Electricity Authority of Thailand. 
The technical assistance would also go to the National Electronics and Computer 
Technology Center for the development of a nationwide, high capacity information 
network for government services. Furthermore, Mr. Chuan said 165 scholarships worth 
$3 million would be granted to Thai students in America to mark 165 years of bilateral 
relations. 
3. Thai exports have increased with the depreciation of the baht. The trade 
balance and current account have improved. The trend is expected to continue in 1998. 
To increase the export, the benefits of a weak baht will be used for gaining some 
advantage. Amid all the gloom, everyone in Thailand accepts that the depreciation of the 
baht will help the economy to some extent. 
Among whom were the following: 
Boontipa Simaskul, inspector-general at the Commerce Ministry, said 
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"The weaker baht would enable Thai products to compete with 
those from China, its major competitor. In 1996 Thailand began losing 
ground to China, particularly in labor-intensive sectors such as garments, 
footwear and parts." 43 
But with weak currencies the rule rather than the exception in the region now, it is 
not certain that Thailand will maintain an advantage for long. 
However, Mrs. Boontipa said that 
"If the baht had not plunged in value, the outlook for exporters 
would have been far worse by now.,,44 
Charin Hansuebsai, deputy director-general of the Business Economics 
Department, said 
"One bright spot would be exports of agricultural products. The El 
Nino weather phenomenon had affected food production in many 
countries, and Thailand was well positioned to meet demand.,,45 
Indonesia ordered 120,000 tons of tapioca flour from Thailand, and the figure had 
been expected to rise to 200,000 tons by the end of 1997. Mrs. Boontipa gave credit to 
Dr Narongchai Akrasanee, who served as Commerce minister throughout most of 1997, 
for removing many export obstacles. For example, the Revenue Department was ordered 
to speed up value-added tax refunds to exporters with good records, cutting the waiting 
time to 45 days, and to 90 days for other exporters. 
Dr. Narongchai also cut tariffs on textile- and garment-related machinery to only 
5%, established a one-stop Customs office, and deregulated automobile exports. 




However, Viroj Amatakulchai, chairman ofthe Federation of Thai Textile Industries, said 
efforts to relax customs-related regulations and cut other red tape were just a start. 
He said, for example, that promises of speedier VAT refunds from the Revenue 
Department had not materialized for small and medium-sized exporters. 
According to the depreciation of baht, The Commerce Ministry expected exports 
for 1997 would increase by 26% in baht terms to l.7 trillion baht, and by 3.5% in dollars 
to $57.87 billion. This would ease the impact of the economic downturn and, it hoped, be 
one of the engines for a recovery. 
During the January-October period of 1997, exports increased by 19.8% in baht to 
l.3 trillion baht, and by 4.4% in dollars to $48 billion. Among principal exports, 
automobiles and autoparts showed the most rapid growth, partly due to the slowdown of 
domestic demand. Exports from this sector grew by 109% in the period. Also, exports of 
electrical and electronic products expanded well. Computers and parts accounted for 
11.4% of total exports, increasing by 12.4% in the first three-quarters. Further more, 
exports of integrated circuits increased by 20.5%; radios and televisions and their parts by 
1l.8%, and transformers by 39.1 % for the period. 
The baht's collapse helped exports oflabor-intensive manufactured goods. For 
example, shipments of garments increased by 8% in the first three quarters. During the 
first 10 months, while exports of industrial products grew by 18.4%, those of agricultural 
products grew by 4.1 %. Rice shipments rose by 17.3% and those of frozen shrimps by 
4.4%. 
Exports to ASEAN members accounted for 21.3% of total exports. Sales to 
Malaysia increased by 45.1 % in the first three quarters, and those to Indonesia by 39.2%. 
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The second-largest buyer of Thai products is the United States. Exports to the US grew 
by 24% in the first three quarters. Those to Belgium, Australia, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
also increased significantly. 
During the first 10 months, Thai imports increased by 1.9% to 1.5 trillion baht, 
but dropped by 10.1 % in terms of dollars to $54 billion. The trade balance improved to a 
deficit of 174 billion baht, 53.6% lower than for the same period of 1996. 
Exports are being counted on as the prime mover to save Thailand's ailing economy, and 
signs began to emerge in late 1997 that the weakening of the baht was creating new 
opportunities. 
After zero growth in 1996, the country's exports in 1997 were projected to grow 
by 10% to 1.5 trillion baht. The result, coupled with a slowing of imports, would be a 
narrowing of the worrisome current account deficit. The forecast appears likely to co~e 
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true, as exports showed signs of gradual recovery every month in 1997 except February, 
when there was a decline of 5.1 % compared with the same month in 1996. 
In the first quarter of 1997, exports rose by 1.7% to 360 billion baht on the same 
period ofthe year earlier, while imports fell by 3.4% to 452 billion baht. The trade 
deficit for the period declined by 19.2% to 91 billion baht. 
In the second quarter, the trade deficit dropped sharply by 27.3% to 173 billion 
baht, as a result ofa 3.6% rise in exports and a 4.3% decline in imports. For the first nine 
months, the value of exports were up by 14.9% to 1.2 trillion baht, due in no small part to 
the appreciation of the US dollar after the baht was floated on July 2. 
The weaker currency has made Thailand's exports more competitive against those 
of rivals such as China, India and Latin America. But at the same time, other trade 
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competitors such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have experienced sharp 
currency declines, so competition in global markets is stiff. However, doubts still remain 
whether exports in 1998 will be as healthy as in the previous year. The preliminary 
forecast is for 10% growth over 1997. 
Many negative factors still beset the country, said Nattapong Thongpakdee, an 
economist with the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) and author of a 
TDRI study on international trade and national competitiveness. 
"The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) appears to 
be more optimistic. They have been forecasting since early last year that the 
world's economic outlook for 1998 would be better than in 1997.,,46 
However, many economists question the optimism of the World Bank and IMP, 
given the spread of Asian economic turmoil. If the Asian financial crisis is left unsolved 
for too long, the contagion could spread to Hong Kong, China, the United States and 
throughout the world. Mr. Nattapong warned that the consequences for Thailand's 
exports, if demand slows in traditional markets, could be heavy. 
"Washington is now closely monitoring its 1998 inflation," he 
continued. liThe US Federal Reserve may be forced to raise interest rates 
next year to cap inflation. This will affect the world's cashflow."47 
The extent to which Korea and Japan suffer will also affect Thailand. Investments 
in Thailand from these two major sources may be reduced, and Thai exports to Japan and 
Korea would ultimately suffer, Mr. Nattapong predicted, adding that although the baht is 
46 Internet, http://www.bkkpost.samart.co.th. 
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likely to recover some strength in 1998, the effect on the prospect for Thai exports is 
uncertain. 
A good sign is that the country has recorded a trade surplus in three consecutive 
months - September, October and November 1997 - as a consequence improving the 




v. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
As the result of this research, the hypothesis of Williamson and Haggard may 
explain the success or failure of economic reform used to evaluate Thailand's economic 
policies. A summary of their hypothesis followes: 
1. Economic Condition 
The economic condition in Williamson and Haggard focuses on the crisis and the 
external help that may support change through both intellectual and financial aid. As 
discussed in the chapter IV, Thailand has gained much external support from both private 
and government sectors of many countries. For example, after the beginning of the 
financial crisis, the IMP and the World Bank provided $ 17.2 billion in aid, while Japan 
provided $ 4 billion. Also China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Australia, and Singapore 
provided $ 1 billion each; Indonesia, Korea, and Brunei another $ 500 million each. On 
September 11, 1997, the World Bank also provided another $ 15 million and another 
$ 350 million on December 23,1997.48 In addition, after the prime minister Chuan 
Leekpai's three day official visit to Washington, President Bill Clinton announced his 
support for Thai exports and the provision of technical assistance to some state agencies. 
On March 1998, Thailand was further supported by $ 500 million from the Asian 
Development Bank and $ 430 million from the World Bank on June 1998, another $1.7 
billion from the US Export-Import Bank, the US Oversea Private Investment 
Corporation, and Japan's Oversea Economic Corporation Fund. 
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2. Political Condition 
This research focused only on the military intervention which was due to the lack 
of investors' confidence in a government overthrown by a military coup. Previous Thai 
political history would indicate that there would be a long period of Thai civil-military 
relations in the government of the country. Although well educated civilians and military 
personnel had formed a coalition to develop their own country by changing to a political 
system of democratic government, it was not as advanced as those of the western 
democracies like the U.S .. Most military governments were too authoritarian for a real 
democratic country to accept. After the "Black May Incident" in 1992, Thailand had 
evolved into a stable democracy without military intervention or support. 
The Army Commander-in-ChiefChettha Thanajaro said the 
government could rest assured that the army will not take sides or interfere 
in politics. And he also said "Don't be afraid or became paranoid about 
the army interfering in politics. We fully support the government for we 
are part of it. But we will not get involved in politics. Politics is not for 
us. Finally, the army had other more important duties to attend to.49 
From his speech, it can be assured that the army could guarantee no more military 
interventions in politics at least until the end of the financial crisis because the military 
knew what it would be like if there was another coup. 
This last coup did not necessarily set Thailand back in its slow march to 
democracy, but was presented as a result of misbehavior by the politicians. Furthermore, 
the leader of the coup did not break the rule of the National Economic and Development 
Plan; he still kept running on the same track, developing economic growth as General 
49 Internet, http://www.bangkokpost.com. 
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Suchinda coolly explained after the investors asked about the fall of share prices. He told 
a public audience, tongue in cheek, 
"We soldiers also invest in stocks. I'm thinking of scooping up 
some stocks at a bargain price myself on Monday." 50 
There was indeed a decline on Monday, but only of7.3 % and that was largely 
recovered by a 5.7 percent gain on Tuesday. It quickly became clear that the General did 
not oppose the basic tenets of the last economic policy. Economic growth through 
private enterprise and market forces would still be the recipe. 51 
Now, Thailand is governed by civilians. The general election for the House of 
Representative is held every four years. Thai people select their government leader by 
means of the general elections. Military promotion to high rank, purchases of armed 
equipment, and military budget have to be passed and signed by the prime minister, 
civilian or former military, before being presented to the King. It indicates that the 
military is under civilian control, as it should be in democratic politics. If a member of 
the armed forces becomes a politician, he has to resign from the force first. Coming from 
a military background, they learn how difficult it is to play the political game as a civilian 
because they were not trained in this way. As professional soldiers, they kept politics at a 
distance. 
Thai political history, as discussed in the chapter II, demonstrates the 
development of Thai politics. There are three factors for success in reforming civil-
military relations according to Huntington. First, the norms of military professionalism 
50 The Nation (Bangkok), 25 Februaxy 1991. 
51 Elliott Kulick and Dick Wilson, Thailand's Turn: Profile of a New Drago!!, St Martin's Press New 
York, 1992. 
55 
and civilian control are increasingly being accepted around the world. Second, political 
and military' elites have come to recognize that the institutionalization of what 
Huntington calls "objective civilian control" serves the interests of both. Finally, civil-
military reform has yielded widespread benefits including reductions in military budget 
and man power requirements, the curtailment of human right abuses, and the transfer of 
military-run enterprises, into civilian hands that are popular with society as a whole. 
These successes in reforming civil-military relations in politics will give more confidence 
to investors putting their money and resources into Thailand. 
3. Position of Team 
According to the ideas of Williamson and Haggard in the meaning of the position 
of team: 
"Coherent economic team: must be united on economic strategy. 
Presence of a technopol: economists should be in a position of political 
responsibility as opposed to merely technical advisers." 
Thailand has the new Thai Constitution, first used at the end of 1997, that states 
the need for an economic advisary council. The details in chapter 5 article 76 and article 
89 of new constitution state: 
Article 76: The state must promote public participation in 
regulating its policies and decision making on political issues, on 
formulating economic, social and political development plans and in 
checking on the use of state power of all levels. 52 
Article 89: The state must have an economic and social advisory 
council to advise the Cabinet on relevant problem. Economic and Social 
52 Internet, http://www.nationalmultimedia.com 
56 
Development Plans adopted according to other laws must be approved by 
the council. 53 
These two articles in the Thailand's new constitution are related to Williamson 
and Haggard's hypothesis. They also indicate that Thailand might have developed a plan 
for economic and political reform whether or not a crisis had occurred. 
4. The Reform Program 
At the beginning of Thailand's economic development, it has used the National 
Economic and Social Development Plans. The consequences after using those plans 
were the growth of the economy and the increase in GDP. All plans were designed in 
advance before using them. Thus, after the financial crisis occurred, the Eighth Plan, 
designed before this situation, had to be amended to help solve current problems. After 
the last amendment of the Eighth Plan on November 12, 1997, the Eighth Plan did not 
change its main purpose. The consequences of the debate were to fit the Eighth Plan into 
the current situation. The most important issue was that the plan was required to pay 
more attention to the development of both human and natural resources. Thus, The 
government would increase its support for human resources by giving more education to 
all Thais. Furthermore, natural resources would be secured and preserved for following 
generations of Thais: these reforms will help Thailand prosper in the long run. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Although the conditions of Thailand fit into the hypothesis of Williamson and 
Haggard, it is too early to predict the future of Thailand's economy accurately. It is also 
soon after the crisis of 1997-1998 for all the data to have been collected. Thailand's 
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current recovery plan seems to be on the right track, and its economic problems may 
diminish soon. However, there are some important factors, not provided by this study, 
such as the effect of other countey's economies on Thailand. Thus, the consequence of 
this thesis could not guarantee or predict that Thailand would solve its economic 
problems. It would be better to evaluate Thailand's present state until further research is 
done and information gathered which would provide a more detailed information 
assessment of the country's political and economic development. 
As a consequnce of this evaluation of the effects of the financial crisis on 
Thailand, it should be recognized that the country is nevertheless in a very improved 
economic and democratic state ready to take its place with the other developing countries 
of the Pacific Rim. Thailand's improved conditiontoday is demonstrated by the 
following facts: 
Government: In December 1991, a new Constitution was proposed, which 
provided for a National Assembly ( an elected House of Representatives and a Cabinet 
headed by a Prime Minister). In January 1997, a Constitution Drafting Assembly was 
established to research and draft a new constitution. At the end of this year, the new 
constitution was promulgated. 
Defense: The Thai armed force has an estimated total strength of254,000: 
150,000 in the army, 64,000 in the navy, and 40,000 in the air force. 54 Military service is 
compulsary for two years between the ages of21 to 30. The defence budget for 1997 was 
projected to total 109,000 millian baht. 
54 Maticohen, 28 January 1997, p. 33. 
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Economic Affairs: Thailand's rapid economic growth since the late 1980s has 
encountered certain problems: inadequate infrastructure development including a 
transport crisis in Bangkok, a shortage of highly trained technical personal, a widening 
deficit on the current balance of payments, an inequality of income distribution owing to 
excessive centralization. Inflation began to rise in 1993 and has remained excessively 
high despete the imposition of strict monetory controls. In Febuary 1997, the 
Government approved sufficient reductions in budgetary expenditure in an attempt to 
narrow current deficits. They included government pension schemes introducing 
compulsory saving for government employees, and increased funds for state enterprises 
and commerce. In the long term, it is hoped that Thailand will make the transition from 
an economy based on labor-intensive to one based on manufacturing higher value-added 
goods without the need for increased imports. 
Social Services: Along with this economic development are the social services 
undertaken by the Ministry of Labor: child welfare, family assistance, welfare for the 
aged and destitute, disaster relief welfare, and development programs for the hill tribes 
and land settlements. 
Education: Compulsary education for six years was officially undertaken in 1995 
between the ages of 6 to 11. In 1996, the government extended the periode of 
compulsary education to 9 years. There are now 20 state universities (12 of which are in 
Bangkok) and 26 private universities and colleges providing education for the training of 
young Thai men and women for the new industries, electronic and computer 
technologies, banking and commercial services, providing the professional careers 
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